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The US Commitments to NATO in the Post-Cold War Period 
——A Case Study on Libya 
 





The recent history of the US commitment to NATO has been dominated by economic 
pressures, squabbles over NATO’s military performance in Afghanistan, and the 
apparent American preference for ‘leading from behind’ in Libya. The case study on 
Libya will be especially important in exploring the Obama administration’s 
understanding of the purpose of NATO in the context of current economic pressures, 
domestic US debates about post-War on Terror interventions, and of increasing 
American preoccupation with Pacific (rather than European) security. In the case of 
Libya, the US apparently hesitated to unfold military operations against Libyan 
military targets. It seems to be the first time that the US followed rather than led its 
European allies to a campaign. The reason why the US was reluctant to intervene in 
Libya at the very beginning; why it changed its mind to join the operation later; and 
why it transferred the Libyan mission to NATO and adopted the strategy of ‘leading 
from behind’, reflected on not only the redefinition of ‘American way of war’, but 
also the future of NATO. 
 






The geopolitical conditions which led to the creation of NATO in 1949 rapidly 
disappeared following the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. The new conditions led to 
an American rethinking of the commitment to NATO, just at it led to a refocusing of 
priorities within European members of the alliance. In May 1990, NATO’s Military 
Committee announced that it no longer considered the Warsaw Pact a threat to the 
alliance. President George H.W. Bush then called for spending cuts which would 
eventually result in significant reductions in funding and force levels for NATO’s 
conventional and nuclear forces. The possibility of the termination of institutionalised 
US support for European security was seriously raised in this period, as was the 
possibility of NATO ceasing to exist.  
 
In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, a range of choices for the future 
directions of US foreign policy presented themselves. Between the extremes of global 
policeman and isolationist withdrawal, it seemed likely that the favoured policy would 
be one that 2 ecognized the dynamics of global political and economic 
interdependence and integration. Following major debates about the appropriate 
direction for post-Cold War American internationalism, the Clinton Administration 
not only committed itself to the continuation of NATO, but also began to sponsor a 
major programme of NATO renewal and enlargement. After progressive 
transformation, NATO expanded rather than disbanded. It went on to participate in 
‘out of area’ action in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Libya. It developed a set of 
more or less concerted doctrine regarding ‘new threats’. All these commitments were 
accompanied by major debates about the purpose and capabilities of NATO. Relevant 
debates included continuing tensions between Washington and European capitals over 
defence spending levels; accusations that the US was using NATO as an instrument of 
extra-United Nations (UN) unilateral power; the preference of Washington 
immediately after 9/11 for working through ad hoc rather than institutionalised 
alliance structures; and the developing relationship between NATO and Russia 
(particularly in the context of possible Georgian and Ukrainian membership of the 
organisation). However, NATO continued to exist and Washington remained formally 
committed to the defence of Europe. The recent history of the US commitment has 
been dominated by economic pressures, squabbles over NATO’s military 
performance in Afghanistan, and the apparent American preference for ‘leading from 
behind’ in Libya.  
 
This paper seeks to explain the continuing US commitments to NATO in the post-
Cold War era by researching in some depth the operation in Libya. The case study on 
Libya is especially important in exploring the Obama Administration’s understanding 
of the purpose of NATO in the context of current economic pressures, domestic US 
debates about post-War on Terror interventions, and of increasing American 
preoccupation with Pacific (rather than European) security. The first section of this 
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paper introduces the background to the US response to the Libya crisis; the second 
section analyses why the US hesitate to intervene in Libya at the very beginning; the 
third section addresses why the US eventually decided to participate in the Libyan 
mission, but in a way of ‘leading from behind’; the final section argues that the so-
called ‘Libyan model’ reflects on not only the redefinition of the ‘American way of 
war’, but also the future of NATO. In addition to secondary resources, this paper also 
draws on interviews with both government officials and academic experts, which have 
been conducted in Washington D.C. in 2012.  
 
Background to the US response to the Libyan crisis 
 
Early in 2011, overwhelming anti-government protests swept North Africa: Tunisian 
President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali who had been in power for 23 years was forced to 
flee the country immediately; Egyptian President Muhammed Hosni Mubarak who 
had maintained his 30-plus year hold on authority had no choice but to step down 
from office in just 18 days. These astonishing political changes in neighbouring 
Tunisia and Egypt encouraged similar protests in Algeria, Iraq, Bahrain, Yemen, and 
Libya. 
 
In response, Libyan security forces opened fire with heavy weaponry on protestors. 
Fighter jets and helicopter gunships attacked people who had no means to defend 
themselves.1 Sayf al Islam Al Gaddafi, the eldest of Gaddafi’s sons, highlighted ‘We 
will eradicate them all’ and warned the public that the conflict might escalate into a 
civil war during his televised speech on February 20. 2  Hence, the UN Secretary 
General Ban Ki-moon said Gaddafi had lost his legitimacy when he declared war on 
his people, urging Gaddafi that ‘the human rights and freedom of assembly and 
freedom of speech must be fully protected’ and that the authorities must immediately 
halt violence against civilians.3 At the end of February, Hillary Clinton travelled to 
the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva to remind the international community that 
it had a responsibility to protect universal rights and to hold violators accountable. 
She said that Gaddafi had ‘lost the legitimacy to govern’ and ‘the people of Libya 
have made themselves clear: It is time for Gaddafi to go – now, without further 
violence or delay’.4  However, Gaddafi ignored the condemnation and insisted on 
further repression against demonstrators, which caused a tremendous increase in the 
death toll.5 According to the UN report, protestors killed by Gaddafi’s family-led 
security forces amounted to 1000 in the first 10 days, and civilians that died during 
the conflict reached 3000 in just half a month.6 But Libyan state TV denied there had 
                                                        
1 ‘Libya: Benghazi Clashes Deadly——Witnesses’, BBC News, 18 February 2011. 
2 ‘Gaddafi Son: “We Will Eradicate Them All”’, The Guardian, 21 February 2011. ‘Libya on Brink As Protests Hit 
Tripoli’, The Guardian, 21 February 2011. 
3 ‘Libyan Leader Muammar Gaddafi Appears on State TV’, BBC News, 22 February 2011. ‘Security Council 
Authorises “All Necessary Measures” to Protect Civilians in Libya’, UN News Centre, 17 March 2011. 
4 Hillary Clinton’s memoir: Clinton (2014) Hard Choices, London: Simon and Schuster, 365. 
5 ‘Death Toll in Libya Protest “Hits 120”’, Sky News, 19 February 2011. 
6 On 25 February 2011, according to resolution S-15/1 entitled ‘Situation of Human Rights in the Libyan Arab 
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been any massacres, dismissing the report as ‘baseless lies’ by foreign media. Gaddafi 
even called foreign news channels ‘dogs’ when he appeared on state television on 22 
February.7 Regarding Gaddafi’s comment as an insult, Libya’s diplomats at the UN in 
New York including Deputy Permanent Representative Ibrahim Dabbashi and Libya’s 
most senior diplomat Ali Aujali, called for international intervention to stop Gaddafi’s 
violent action against street demonstration in their homeland.8  
 
However, America hesitated to take any military action. ‘America, it is time to focus 
on nation-building here at home.’9 President Obama restated his doctrine of opposing 
more military entanglements and scaling down the US commitments overseas when 
announcing the withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan in June 2011. There 
seemed to be a strong sense among an overwhelming majority of policymakers and 
the public that America should no longer declare new conflict involvements, given the 
overstretched position due to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the pressures for 
austerity at home. In such circumstances, Robert Gates, then-Secretary of Defence, 
became one of the pioneers to oppose US involvement in Libya. In March 2011, he 
made a statement as follows: ‘My view would be, if there is going to be that kind of 
assistance (providing arms) to the opposition, there are plenty of sources for it other 
than the United States.’ He further added that NATO would act only ‘if there is 
demonstrable need, a sound legal basis and strong regional support’ for military 
action.10 Far worse was Gates’ answer when asked if there would be US ‘boots on the 
ground’. According to the New York Times, Gates swiftly replied ‘Not as long as I am 
in this job’.11 As a result, prior to the adoption of the UN Security Resolution 1973 
which authorised ‘all necessary means’ to protect civilians, America hesitated to make 
any stance, in addition to delivering several vague speeches: the highest-level 
statement at that moment by the US government on the accelerating strife in Libya 
was made by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton who, though condemning the violence 
in Libya and calling for a halt to the ‘unacceptable bloodshed’ in response to civil 
unrest, only aimed to ‘convey this message to the Libyan government’ rather than 
claiming US support of the Libyan people.12 
                                                                                                                                                              
Jamahiriya’, the UN’s Human Rights Council established the International Commission of Inquiry on Libya and 
gave it the mandate ‘to investigate all alleged violations of international human rights law in Libya, to establish the 
facts and circumstances of such violations and of the crimes perpetrated and, where possible, to identify those 
responsible, to make recommendations, in particular, on accountability measures, all with a view to ensuring that 
those individuals responsible are held accountable’. See A/HRC/S-15/1, ‘Report of the Human Rights Council on 
Its Fifteenth Special Session’, 25 February 2011; and A/HRC/19/68, ‘Report of the International Commission of 
Inquiry on Libya’, 02 March 2012. 
7 ‘Libyan Leader Muammar Gaddafi Appears on State TV’, BBC News, 22 February 2011. 
8 ‘Libyan Leader Muammar Gaddafi Appears on State TV’. 
9 ‘Time to Focus on Nation Building Here at Home’, ABC News, 22 June 2011.  
10 Karen Parrish (2011) ‘Gates: NATO’s Libya Plans To Include Military Options’, US Fed News, 10 March. 
Gates’ idea was also shared by the Alliance’s Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, who told reporters that 
NATO was considering a ‘range of options’, including humanitarian help, but that any move would be governed by 
three principles: that there was ‘demonstrable need’, a ‘clear legal basis’ and ‘firm regional support’. See Alan 
Cowell and Steven Erlanger (2011) ‘France Becomes First Country to Recognise Libyan Rebels’, The New York 
Times, 10 March. 
11 Elisabeth Bumiller and Thom Shanker (2011) ‘2 Cabinet Officials Say US Isn’t Likely to Arm Libyans’, The 
New York Times, 31 March. Elliott Abrams (2011) ‘Mr. Gates Oversteps’, The Council on Foreign Relations, 31 
March. ‘Gates: No US Ground Troops in Libya on His Watch’, USA Today, 31 March. 
12  ‘Clinton to Libya: End “Unacceptable Bloodshed”’, CNN, 22 February 2011. The UN Security Council 
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Why did the US hesitate to intervene in Libya at the very beginning? 
 
Low public enthusiasm for a third Middle East war 
There were many arguments that tried to disconnect what was happening in Libya 
from US strategic interests. Firstly, public support was very low in the context of 
financial crisis and in particular the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Ambassador 
Kathleen Stephens believed that the American people understood that to retain a 
leadership role in the world, fundamentally the US needed to be strong and 
competitive in economy and infrastructure, therefore performing the Libyan mission 
would not be an acceptable choice among the mass.13 In addition, considering both 
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan had become increasingly unpopular with most 
Americans, Robert Litwak argued that fatigue of the two wars and uncertainty about 
what the outcome would be in Libya were the main factors that decreased the 
Administration’s enthusiasm for getting involved in another Middle East war. 14 
Steven Heydemann also agreed that public tolerance for military engagement was 
quite low after 10 years war in Iraq and Afghanistan, which produced a national 
fatigue for intervention.15  
 
In reality, not only current public opinion towards war, but also how the 
Administration viewed a further military engagement, have been greatly influenced 
by the legacy of previous wars. Barack Obama is the president who campaigned on 
ending the wars in Iraq, on reaching out of the Muslim World, and on building a 
better relationship between the US and the Arab World, thus starting another war 
against an Arab Muslim country was seen as highly undesirable for the 
Administration.16 Both Matthew Kroenig and Nora Bensahel emphasised that it would 
be politically dangerous for President Obama to announce the intervention, not only 
in terms of how it would be perceived but also how it would be in reality of getting 
involved in a third Middle East war.17 Even though France and Britain took the lead to 
declare war against Gaddafi, the Obama Administration remained silent because its 
policy was extended at hand.  
 
An American project or a European project? 
Secondly, it was widely accepted that there were no direct, first-order US interests at 
stake in Libya, hence the US response to a state that imposed no threat to American 
                                                                                                                                                              
Resolution 1973, 17 March 2011. 
13 Interview with Kathleen Stephens, US Ambassador to South Korea, 18 July 2012. 
14 Interview with Robert Litwak, Vice President for Scholars and Director of international Security Studies at the 
Woodrow Wilson Center, 10 July 2012. 
15 Interview with Steven Heydemann. 
16 President Obama (2008) ‘Obama’s Speech on Iraq’, Council on Foreign Relations, 19 March. President Obama 
(2008) ‘Obama’s Remarks on Iraq and Afghanistan’, The New York Times, 15 July. ‘Barack Obama and What He 
Said on the Iraq War’, The Telegraph, 14 December 2011. President Obama (2010) ‘Address to the Nation on the 
End of Combat Operations in Iraq’, 31 August. 
17 Interview with Nora Bensahel; interview with Matthew Kroenig, Stanton nuclear Security Fellow at the Council 
on Foreign Relations, 17 July 2012. 
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people would not be necessary. Steven Heydemann supported this idea by saying that 
it was difficult to argue that Libya rose above the threshold that made it a vital 
strategic interest for the US. 18  Thus ‘Nowhere in the administration’s public 
statements was there any assessment of US interests in Libya that would justify 
American military intervention’. 19  In terms of hard-core national interests, as 
Christopher Chivvis mentioned, the US did not see Libya as attractive in the field of 
energy or gas, but the European allies were getting gas and oil from Libya through 
enormous contracts. 20  How the Libyan crisis had affected European countries’ 
economic interests was evidenced by the increase of oil prices to their highest levels 
since the global financial crisis of 2008 due to Gaddafi’s plan to end Libya’s National 
Oil Corporation’s (NOP) contracts with Western oil groups including oil giant BP.21 
Furthermore, European security was more directly challenged because geographically 
Europe was closer to Libya, therefore potential refugees would flow across 
Mediterranean and destabilise the European governments and economies. With 
respect to this, Karim Mezran compared the US attitudes toward Iraq and Libya, 
concluding that the reason why the US was active in Afghanistan and passive in Libya 
was because Afghanistan was an American project while Libya was a European 
project.22 But, since the Libyan mission was related to European interests, how could 
the US avoid getting involved, given the intimate transatlantic relationship?  
 
Theoretically whether a mission is an American project or a European project depends 
on who is responding to the attack, but this definition is apparently inappropriate 
taking into account the narrow and limited basis. For example, Afghanistan was an 
American project in the sense that the US was responding to the attack, but it was also 
very international from the beginning in terms of the understanding of why 
Afghanistan mattered. The US got expressions of support from every country around 
the world that understood what happened on 11 September 2001 was an attack on the 
US and thereby a military response would be seen as self-defence. There were 
tremendous international involvements starting in January 2002, in view of a shared 
belief that reconstruction was necessary to prevent the disaster from happening again. 
It was true that the US was leading the military operation, yet the US also received 
remarkable support from other countries. Even Russia and China had openly 
expressed their support, regarding US military activity in Afghanistan as self-defence. 
In that sense, it would be unfair to define Afghanistan solely as an American project, 
and similarly, Libya should not be considered as a European project though no direct 
US interests were actually at stake.  
 
                                                        
18 Interview with Steven Heydemann. 
19 Martin Indyk, Kenneth Lieberthal and Michael O’Hanlon. (2012) Bending History: Barack Obama’s Foreign 
Policy, Washington: Brookings Institution Press, p. 161. 
20 Interview with Christopher Chivvis, Senior Political Scientist at RAND, 16 July 2012. 
21 Garry White (2011) ‘BP’s Contracts in Libya “Still Valid” Despite Turmoil’, The Telegraph, 17 March. ‘Libyan 
Leader Muammar Gaddafi Appears on State TV’, BBC News, 22 February 2011. Although Gaddafi did not really 
replace Western oil groups with companies from Russia, India and China, his comments and the unrest in Libya 
did suspend BP’s and Royal Dutch Shell’s exploration programmes. 
22 Interview with Karim Mezran, Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council, 09 July 2012. 
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Pragmatic reasons 
Whenever the US decides to intervene in a regional crisis, it knows that it has to do a 
large amount of the work, implementing most part of the campaign and investing 
ample resources, technologies, intelligences, surveillances, air-refueling, etc. Usually 
the US is not reluctant to take actions as long as it suspects that (potential) threats 
exist or US interests are at stake there. This assumption enables the US to play a 
dominant role in crisis management around the world, which also incidentally brings 
more responsibilities to the US at the same time. The pre-war estimation 
demonstrated that Libya would not be an exception in terms of resources spending. If 
the US, rather than France and Britain, took the lead in Libya, it would have provided 
the majority of forces as it did in the past to make it possible. But in the situation 
where the US had its forces committed in many other parts of the world, the 
recognition about what Libya would take for the US was uncertain. Dominique de 
Villepin, the French minister of Foreign Affairs, made a judgment prior to the 
invasion of Iraq, warning that intervention was not only about winning the campaign, 
but also about continuing with post-war peace-building tasks.  
 
The option of war might seem a priori to be the swiftest. But let us not forget that having 
won the war, one has to build peace. Let us not delude ourselves. This will be long and 
difficult because it will be necessary to preserve Iraq’s unity and restore stability in a 
lasting way in a country and region harshly affected by the intrusion of force.23  
 
Nonetheless, Washington dismissed such prescient warnings. It soon saw Iraq 
becoming a miserable story. The lesson from Iraq, particularly with regard to the 
underestimated costs and time spent on that mission, highly constrained the 
Americans’ tolerance for helping transform one more country like Iraq. Indeed, how 
could a country, with anticipation that the costs of war would be much higher than the 
benefits regardless of the necessity to join that war, agree to take actions concretely?  
 
To sum up, apparently, the reason why America was reluctant to intervene in Libya at 
first lay in domestic pressures. The legacy of the US ‘War on Terror’ scared both the 
US policy-makers and the public, who could not bear the US sinking into another 
‘quagmire’ as in the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq. Inside the Administration, the 
debate mainly centred on the question of humanitarian intervention – whether it was 
worth ‘saving strangers’ regardless of cost – one that continued to vex the 
governments of the US and other democracies.24 According to Susan Rice, the Iraq 
war had set back the cause of humanitarian intervention by discrediting American 
military missions abroad and making it more difficult to rally consensus to stop a 
massacre.25 But when economic sanctions and diplomatic means were proved failures 
in stopping Gaddafi and when those innocent civilians were pleading with the 
                                                        
23 Dominique de Villepin (2003) ‘Statement by Dominique de Villepin to the UNSC’, Foreign Policy, 14 February 
2003.  
24 Nicholas Wheeler (2002) Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.   
25 Massimo Calabresi (2011) ‘Susan Rice: A Voice for Intervention’, Time, 24 March. 
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international community to save them, should the US continue to brush off the 
enquiry with meaningless verbal condemnation? 26  It was understandable that 
Washington was under considerable military, economic and political pressure due to 
its overstretched position around the world, but was that a persuasive argument on US 
inability to conduct necessary military intervention, given Gaddafi’s brutality and 
intransigence, the Arab leaders’ hostility toward Gaddafi, and the determination by 
Britain and France that military intervention in Libya was in their interests? 
 
Why did the US eventually decide to participate in the Libyan 
mission? 
 
The realistic dimension: traditional national interests were present 
From a pure realist perspective, the roots of intervening in Libya were inadequate in 
the sense that there were no direct, first-order US interests at stake. However, though 
acknowledging that America’s security was not threatened, President Obama 
emphasised that he had a responsibility to act when the US ‘interests and values’ were 
at risk. According to him, ‘That is what happened in Libya over the course of these 
last six weeks.’27 Charles Kupchan mentioned that traditional national interests were 
not completely absent in Libya. He underlined two categories of national interests that 
were involved in Libya.28 On one hand, taking actions in Libya was an important step 
in providing support for the Arab Spring and in sending a signal that crackdowns on 
democratic protests would not be tolerated. On the other hand, by highlighting 
external pressures from actors such as the French, the British, and the Arab League, 
the US did not want to be seen as blocked to act by others because it had, for a long 
time, been encouraging others to be more proactive and more responsible.  
 
Christopher Chivvis took the same view on where the national security interests were, 
emphasising the main one was to show support for the revolutions that were taking 
place across the Arab World. He also agreed that the US was facing pressures from 
other countries, yet he stressed on the original intention for intervening was to help 
the allies rather than to passively respond to those pressures.29 There was a concern 
that if the situation went out of control in Libya, anxieties would spread across 
borders to the east and west of Egypt, thereby lots of refugees would go to Europe, 
which would become a tremendous threat to the allies. Reducing the allies’ security 
would reduce the US own security in a second way, given that they both belonged to 
the same alliance that embraced the principle that ‘an attack against one member state 
is considered an attack against all’. When the ABC News’ Senior White House 
Correspondent Jake Tapper asked Secretary of Defence Robert Gates on the ‘This 
                                                        
26 According to a Gullup poll conducted in 2012, 75% of the Libyans said that they favoured intervention and 
supported NATO’s military involvement in their nation’s conflict. See Jay Loschky (2012) ‘Opinion Briefing: 
Libyans Eye New Relations With the West’, Gullup Politics, 13 August. 
27 President Obama (2011) Obama Libya Speech: US ‘Interests and Values’ at Risk, 28 March.  
28 Interview with Charles Kupchan. 
29 Interview with Christopher Chivvis. 
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Week’ show about whether Libya posed an actual or imminent threat to the US, Gates 
answered ‘No…but the engagement of the Arabs, the engagement of the Europeans, 
the general humanitarian question that was at stake’.30 Generally the US perceived at 
least two traditional national interests at stake in Libya: to encourage those Arab 
countries that were fighting for democracy and to assist the allies who used to support 
the US when needed. More importantly, US policy on Libya was consistent with 
Obama’s grand strategy on ‘counterpunching’ that the Administration ‘has been 
willing to assert its influence and ideals across the globe when challenged by other 
countries, reassuring allies and signalling resolve to rivals’.31 
 
Encourage Arab countries 
In ‘Obama’s Interventions: Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya’, Luca Tardelli was on target 
arguing that ‘Obama’s decision to intervene in Libya resulted from the 
administration’s desire to both avert a possible humanitarian disaster in Benghazi as 
well as to safeguard the revolutionary transitions taking place both in Libya and 
neighbouring countries’.32 Stephen Flanagan shared the same view, predicting that if 
Gaddafi were allowed to undertake actions against Benghazi and others in the west, it 
would have been a signal to other authoritarian leaders in the Middle East that the 
West would not bother if they could just kill enough people.33 From the US policy 
perspective, there was a great hope about the Arab awakening in the Arab Spring. In 
Obama’s speech on the Middle East and North Africa on 19 May 2011, the President 
identified the Arab Spring as a ‘historical opportunity’ to translate US support for 
‘political and economic reform in the Middle East and North Africa that can meet the 
legitimate aspirations of ordinary people throughout the region’ into concrete 
actions. 34  Hillary Clinton, the Secretary of State, also reaffirmed the American 
conviction that ‘real democratic change…is in the national interest of the US’.35 Their 
analysis proved admirably accurate, in that if Gaddafi were able to depict himself as 
impregnable, it would have been very damaging to the rest of what was happening in 
the Arab World. Some of the other authoritarian regimes would decide to use brutal 
repression as a way to end protests as well. Robert Gates believed that a potential 
significantly destabilising event taking place in Libya would put the revolutions in 
both Tunisia and Egypt at risk, given that Libya was a ‘part of a broader wave of 
unrest across North Africa and the Middle East that had led to the ousting of long-
standing regimes in Tunisia and Egypt’.36 These concerns resulted in the formation of 
a very strong group of advisers, which was led by the Special Assistant to the 
President Samantha Power, the US Ambassador to the UN Susan Rice and Hillary 
                                                        
30 Joshua Miller (2011) ‘Defence Secretary: Libya did not pose threat to US, was not “vital national interest” to 
intervene’, ABC News, 27 March.  
31 Daniel Drezner (2011) ‘Does Obama Have a Grand Strategy?: Why We Need Doctrines in Uncertain Times’, 
Foreign Affairs, July/August Issue. 
32 Luca Tardelli (2011) p22. 
33 Interview with Stephen Flanagan. 
34 President Obama (2011) Remarks by the President on the Middle East and North Africa, 19 May. 
35 Luca Tardelli (2011) p21. 
36 Joshua Miller (2011). ‘Security Council Authorises “All Necessary Measures” to Protect Civilians in Libya’, UN 
News Centre, 17 March. 
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Clinton, warning that the US inaction would undermine the process of political 
change in the Middle East.37 Thus, the consensus became clear that only through 
intervention could the US avoid sending this kind of wrong message that the 
international community would allow this kind of slaughter to continue recklessly. 
 
Assist European allies 
It was worth questioning whether the US was ‘pushed’ by the other countries to 
participate in the Libyan mission? Or was the US ‘self-motivated’ by the notion that 
‘your allies’ interests become your interests’? In other words, did Washington give 
priority to the need of helping European allies when making decision on whether to 
intervene in Libya? James Lindsay insisted that in the case of Libya, the 
Administration would hardly do anything if it had not been through the French and 
the British lobbying Washington because there were certainly plenty of other places 
that were calling for humanitarian interventions. 38  President Obama and Hillary 
Clinton found themselves driven by concerns on what the allies wanted, which had 
ever happened in Kosovo where the allies knew clearly about what should be done 
there. Similarly in Libya, the French and the British were well aware of the necessity 
to get involved: ‘Despite all negative comments, Libya shows that there is a political 
and diplomatic dynamic of European construction and an active European voice in 
world affairs’.39 Lindsay’s argument was mainly based on the realistic and strategic 
assumption that Washington had very little at stake in Libya, but he ignored the fact 
that if Washington understood it was crucial to help its allies in Libya, it would join 
the operation regardless of whether or when its allies made the request; yet if 
Washington denied the emergency to provide support to its allies, it would not 
announce participation even if its allies required. Perhaps a better explanation would 
be that US decision on Libya was accelerated, not determined, by the French and the 
British lobbying. The US might have already noticed its allies had immense interests 
in peril. For example, France and Britain were worried about the potential instability 
and the increasing violent extremism, and Italy was particularly concerned about the 
potential refugees. 40  Without doubt, when two very close US allies, France and 
Britain, were asking the US to get involved, the possibility of US engagement in 
Libya would certainly increase. According to Hillary Clinton, ‘How could you stand 
by when France and the UK and other Europeans and the Arab League and your Arab 
partners were saying you have got to do something?’41 Thus, the internal belief——
                                                        
37 James Mann (2012) The Obamians: The Struggle Inside the White House to Redefine American Power, New 
York: Viking. David Gergen (2011) ‘What Is Obama’s Endgame in Libya?’, CNN, 21 March. 
38 Interview with James Lindsay, Senior Vice President, Director of Studies and Maurice R. Greenberg Chair at the 
Council on Foreign Relations, 10 July 2012. 
39 This is said by Bernard Valero, the spokesman of the French Foreign Ministry. See Steven Erlanger (2011) 
‘France and Britain Lead Military Push on Libya’, The New York Times, 18 March.  
40 Specifically, France played a vanguard role in carrying out intervention in Libya, because it had a very large 
immigrant population that originated in the Maghreb, and for which the ‘Arab Spring’ was vitally important and a 
source of fascination and pride. See Dominique Moisi (2011) ‘France Had A Duty to Intervene in Libya’, The 
Guardian, 23 March. 
41 Joshua Miller (2011) ‘Defence Secretary: Libya did not pose threat to US, was not “vital national interest” to 
intervene’. 
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‘though the strategic interest was not direct in Libya, there was a strategic interest in 
helping US allies’——ultimately facilitated US intervention in Libya.42  
 
Moreover, Libya witnessed a critical moment when the Europeans were willing to do 
something on their own, which had long been expected by the US. France and Britain 
had mentioned clearly at the very start that they intended to take the lead in enforcing 
a no-fly zone. Spain, Norway and Denmark quickly expressed their support by saying 
that they would contribute to the operation.43 To have the Europeans shoulder more in 
terms of defence both in and outside of Europe was exactly what the US had wished 
to see since the end of the Cold War. With respect to that, Libya became an 
opportunity for the US to offer assistance in a way of encouraging its allies to make 
more contributions to future tasks. The good function of an alliance is based on all 
members’ respect for the principle that ‘you help me, I help you’. Each member is 
expecting from an alliance that it will get something in return, not simply ‘do 
somebody’s laundry’. There is no exception to the US. In the case of Libya, 
Washington was of course willing to see European capitals volunteer to assume the 
responsibility, yet at the same time it was also willing to provide necessary help when 
required. Last but not least, offering its allies support was also beneficial to 
consolidating the US position as a leader in the global security architecture. Although 
Washington repeatedly asked the European capitals to shoulder more responsibility, it 
did not mean that the US was hoping for a real shift towards a more balanced 
partnership with Europe, in which the US would give up its dominant role. Therefore, 
when the allies asked for US assistance in Libya, it simultaneously reaffirmed the 
perception of how important the US was to the international security system. In this 
sense, the US was certainly motivated by self-fulfilment rather than persuaded or 
pushed by its allies to take actions in Libya, though the request from the Europeans 
also played an essential role. 
 
The humanitarian dimension: another ‘Afghanistan’ or another ‘Rwanda’? 
There is no doubt that the Libyan mission served some US interests, yet the 
understanding of what US interests were involved in Libya was not wide-spread at the 
beginning. As a result, a heated debate arose among officials in the Administration 
over whether to take actions in Libya, entailing how realism versus liberal 
internationalism could exert influence on US foreign policy. Inside the Administration, 
senior officials were lined up on both sides. On one hand, Robert Gates, then-US 
Secretary of Defence, Thomas Donilon, National Security Advisor, and John Brennan, 
the chief counterterrorism adviser to Obama, strongly opposed to the intervention in 
Libya. Bearing realists’ calculations in mind, they urged caution by arguing that 
‘Libya was not vital to American national security interests’.44 Gates made his views 
known at the very beginning, saying that the US should stick to offering 
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communications, surveillance and other support rather than putting its ‘boots on the 
ground’. He was opposed to attacking Libya and had said as much in several public 
statements. Donilon was also reportedly wary of the effects of committing to a 
lengthy military mission in Libya.45 As he stressed, the US had already been in wars 
in Iraq and Afghanistan, not to mention that there were other more urgent national 
security threats on the rise such as the Iran nuclear programme. Brennan even 
expressed his concern that the Libyan rebels remained largely unknown to US 
officials, and could have ties to Al-Qaeda. According to him, groups such as Al-
Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb were active in Algeria and other countries in the region 
and had sought to bolster the opposition to Gaddafi, raising fears about the type of 
government that could replace the four-decade-old dictatorship if it fell.46 In general, 
people in Gates’ camp shared concerns about US involvement in Libya, further 
warning the Administration that the Libyan war might turn out to be another 
deadlocked ‘Afghanistan’, which had already become a nightmare of all Americans.  
 
On the other hand, Samantha Power, who was not only the Special Assistant to 
President Obama but also a writer of a Pulitzer Prize winning book about the genocide 
in Rwanda a decade ago, formed the other influential camp within the government 
with Susan Rice, the US Ambassador to the UN, and Hillary Clinton, the Secretary of 
State, expecting to accelerate US steps to take actions in Libya. As major advocates, 
they were mainly concerned that the Libyan crisis would deteriorate into another 
‘Rwanda’, where ‘the Security Council fails even to consider taking decisive action in 
the face of genocide, mass murder, and/or ethnic cleansing’ 47 . Dating back to 
December 2007 when then-Senator Hillary Clinton was interviewed on ‘This Week’ 
show, she had already expressed her regrets about Rwanda and stressed her 
determination to prevent ‘more Rwandas’ in the future: ‘I think that for me it was one 
of the most poignant and difficult experiences when…I was able to go to Rwanda and 
be part of expressing our deep regrets because we did not speak out adequately 
enough and we certainly did not take action.’48 In the case of Libya, Hillary Clinton 
again recalled those instances from recent history when a lack of US intervention had 
left hundreds of thousands dead, emphasising that the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P) 
was acquired as humanitarian emergency arose. She said that the UN-backed military 
intervention in Libya would be ‘a watershed moment in international decision-making. 
We learned a lot in the 1990s. We saw what happened in Rwanda. It took a long time 
in the Balkans, in Kosovo to deal with a tyrant’.49  
 
Susan Rice was a staffer at the National Security Council (NSC) when the world 
failed to stop the genocide in Rwanda. According to the Time magazine, Susan Rice 
once told Samantha Power, who was then a Harvard scholar, ‘I swore to myself that if 
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I ever faced such a crisis (as Rwanda) again, I would come down on the side of 
dramatic action, going down in flames if that was required.’50 As Gaddafi’s troops 
closed in on the rebel stronghold of Benghazi on 15 March 2011, Obama put the fate 
of the city’s one million residents in the hands of Rice who, as the US Ambassador to 
the UN, was determined to get a tougher resolution allowing broader intervention. 
Rice stated that humanitarian intervention was not about going to war for imminent 
national security needs but to save innocent lives. Hence, she moved on to stress that 
Gaddafi’s violence had already placed the question of when to intervene to save lives 
squarely on the table.51 Samantha Power was also one of the Obamians with deep-
seated ideas on the issue of Libya. In the light of press reports of Samantha Power, it 
would be extremely embarrassing to have people again criticise Washington for 
decades that it had stood by while the Libyan massacre was going on.52 
 
Now, the three women were pushing for US intervention to stop a looming 
humanitarian catastrophe in Libya. Senator John Kerry (D-MA) depicted the debate 
within the Administration as ‘healthy’, reemphasising that ‘the memory of Rwanda, 
alongside Iraq, made it clear’ that the US needed to act.53 As the potential slaughter of 
the Libyan Benghazi uprising framed around a need for humanitarian intervention, 
Power’s camp began to play a more important role. The broad outline of a reason for 
US intervention became visible. President Obama was eventually convinced by the 
humanitarian calculations that the US had the responsibility to prevent Gaddafi from 
slaughtering innocent civilians, stating that the UN, the Arab League and other 
countries ‘are saying we need to intercede to make sure that a disaster does not 
happen on our watch as has happened in the past when the international community 
stood idly by’.54 He further rejected the argument for inaction when defending US 
military involvement in Libya as a necessary humanitarian intervention on 28 March , 
saying that 
  
To brush aside America’s responsibility as a leader and——more profoundly——our 
responsibilities to our fellow human beings under such circumstances would have been a 
betrayal of who we are…Some nations may be able to turn a blind eye to atrocities in 
other countries. The United States of America is different. And as President, I refused to 
wait for the images of slaughter and mass graves before taking action.55  
 
Actually before the senior-level meeting was held at the White House on 15 March 
the consensus around Washington was that military action against Libya was not in 
the cards. However, after the meeting where ‘the President was referring to the 
broader change going on in the Middle East and the need to rebalance US foreign 
policy toward a greater focus on democracy and human rights’, the White House 
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completely altered its stance and successfully pushed for the authorisation for military 
intervention in Libya.56 Steve Clemons, the foreign policy chief at the New America 
Foundation summarised that ‘Gates is clearly not on board with what is going 
on…Clinton won the bureaucratic battle to use DOD resources to achieve what is 
essentially the State Department’s objective…and Obama let it happen’.57 It was true 
that ‘Hillary and Susan Rice were key parts of this story because Hillary got the Arab 
buy-in and Susan worked the UN to get a 10-to-5 vote, which is no easy thing’, but it 
was also worth noting that the key decision was in fact made by Obama himself.58 
Matthew Kroenig recalled the story he had been told by a government official that on 
15 March, the President listened to the options being presented at the meeting, then he 
left the room and thought about it and then on his own made the decision that he did 
not want another Rwanda and was prepared to intervene even though there might not 
be enough interests at stake.59   
 
For the President, the US had to take actions to show the world that this was 
something the Americans were not acting out of any narrow interests. There was no 
secret plan to get the Libyan oil or to do something else that would take over Libya. It 
was truly a response to an international demand. In other words, for the US, ‘Libya 
was a special case——urgent military intervention was required to stave off a 
humanitarian disaster’.60 As James Mann concludes in ‘The Obamians’, President 
Obama’s intervention in Libya demonstrated for the first time that he was willing to 
put the American military to work on behalf of humanitarian goals, in a way that the 
realists he admired would not.61 But if the decision was simply driven by liberal 
internationalists’ considerations, why not Somalia or Congo, where people were also 
suffering from humanitarian crisis the same as the Libyan? Why did Obama’s stance 
in Libya differ significantly from his strategy regarding the other Arab revolutions?62 
A lot of people believed these differences undermined the humanitarian claims that 
the US leaders made about their objectives in intervening in Libya. Moreover, as time 
wore on and the Syrian death toll mounted, the explanation that the US intervened in 
Libya mainly because of humanitarian consideration became increasingly implausible. 
In fact, the reality was not that simple. There was actually a third dimension that often 
left out of discussion, namely feasibility. 
 
A third dimension: feasibility 
Legitimacy 
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Christopher Chivvis thought the reason why the US intervened in Libya rather than 
Congo or Somalia was because Libya was feasible. The source of its feasibility, as he 
identified, came from legitimacy.63 It was the fact that Gaddafi was the spy of broader 
international community, including the Arab World, hence there was far-ranging 
support for this intervention not only in the US and Europe, but also in the region 
itself.64 This was a very important condition that made the intervention possible and 
legitimate. In addition, China and Russia did not stand in the way, facilitating the 
adoption of a UN Security Council Resolution that authorised member states to take 
military actions. 65  There has always been functional value placed on getting 
international approval. What would happen in the Gulf War if George H. W. Bush 
were unable to get the UN Security Council Resolution? The authorisation was 
important, whereas it did not mean that the US would not occasionally intervene even 
without a UN Security Council Resolution. The reason why the President went to get 
the UN authorisation was not because he regarded it as vital to wage a war, instead, he 
made the calculation that it would enable the US to avoid political problems at home. 
Similarly in the case of Libya, the US did not take any action until the UN legitimised 
it, which helped Washington obtain both strategic and moral advantages.  
 
However, it was not sufficiently convincing to join a campaign just with the UN 
authorisation. The legacy of Kosovo and Iraq reminded the US that an intervention 
should be both legal and legitimate, otherwise people would be able to criticise it 
from either perspective. As Charles Kupchan said, the intervention in Kosovo was 
illegal but legitimate, because even though there was no UN Security Council 
Resolution, Kosovo enjoyed broad support in the core world opinion; while the 
invasion in Iraq was legal but illegitimate, because it received authorisation but did 
not gain enough support around the world.66 In the case of Libya, one of the reasons 
why the intervention enjoyed legitimacy was NATO. If it had been the US alone, it 
would have been much more problematic. That was also why Washington insisted on 
using NATO even though France initially opposed NATO carrying out military 
support in view of the concern that ‘the Alliance has an aggressive image in the Arab 
World’.67   
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Karim Mezran argued that Italy was the first country that demanded a NATO 
command.68 Although France and Britain wanted to go on their own, they found their 
feet stopped by the Italians who refused to approve either a French or a British 
command. What France and Britain were truly talking about was to have a combined 
Anglo-French command outside of the NATO command structure, yet Italy insisted 
on going through NATO precisely to make it more international on the European side 
and to keep the US operating within the NATO framework.69 Thus, the Europeans 
had no choice but to require the US help to solve the dilemma, given that the allies 
had already broken up on this issue: France and Britain wanted to go alone; Italy 
rejected them to go; and Germany wanted to be neutral.70 It became clear that the US 
had to intervene to complete the mission by dragging in NATO, otherwise Italy would 
be the incredible cost for the US. There was a desire to preserve the alliance unity, but 
the alliance was not united on this. In fact, Italy’s bid to call for a NATO command 
mainly rested on its intension to have the US on board, which would guarantee that 
the allies could win the war. Umberto Bossi, the truculent founder of the Northern 
League Party was putting pressure on Silvio Berlusconi not to act, because he was 
badly worried about retaliation due to the close distance between Italy and Libya.71 
There was a feeling that Gaddafi might unleash some of his agencies to cause terrorist 
attacks on Italy. On the other hand, a lot of Italians were having Libyan contracts for 
construction or energy, hence they would lose all those contracts if Gaddafi were 
going to survive though the allies intervened. The Italians were actually riding the 
fence, and they could not come down one side or the other. By assessing the full 
complexity of the situation, the Italians were certainly more cautious than the French 
and the British, thereby more eager to see Gaddafi lose the war. As a result, the 
Libyan operation was implemented under the framework of NATO rather than of any 
bilateral cooperation.  
 
Cost 
Another source of feasibility came from the evaluation of military inputs. Nora 
Bensahel believed what ultimately convinced President Obama to intervene in Libya 
was that the mission was very low cost to the US.72 The European allies made clear 
they only wanted US help for the initial air campaign and some intelligence support 
thereafter. President Obama agreed that the US could have this limited involvement 
without taking responsibility for what would happen in the country after Gaddafi fell. 
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The assessment that it would be done at very low cost turned out to be correct: the 
total cost to the US, excluding man hours and military personnel who worked on it, 
was about one billion dollars. It was very little in the scheme of the US defence 
budget which used to reach 550 billion dollars a year before the US got to the costs of 
wars in either Afghanistan or Iraq. Why the cost was low, as Bensahel further 
explained, was because of limited involvement.73 It was hard to imagine what the 
scenario would be for the US to get involved at tremendously high cost. With regard 
to this, Syria was the comparative case to show why the US decided to take actions in 
Libya not in other states that were also suffering from humanitarian crises. Although 
Syria was of greater strategic importance to the US than Libya in terms of chain 
reaction that resolving the Syrian crisis would also deal a severe setback to Iran’s 
grandiose Middle East ambitions, it did not see Obama actively seek Assad’s 
overthrow. Libya was basically a big flight desert, making military options in Libya 
much easier. For instance, the Libyan air defences could be quickly taken out from the 
sky because they were not advanced, thus the allies could have free control of the sky 
without putting any personnel really on the ground. Syria, quite the opposite, had 
more effective air force and air defences, which would make enforcing a no-fly zone 
more difficult. Thus, there was no way to affect the course of conflicts solely from the 
air, and it would cost hundreds of thousands of troops if ground presence was the only 
solution, regardless of the fact that Syria was with no guarantee of a good outcome. In 
other words, the US had limited tools available to effect change in Syria, given ‘the 
capabilities of the Syrian army, its alliance with Hezbollah and Iran, and the fact that 
the US forces were now engaged in three wars in the Middle East already’. 74 
Moreover, the Libyan rebels had already controlled a good portion of the country, 
enabling the allies to work with them on the civilian side. Yet unlike in Libya, the US 
ambassador to Syria reported that ‘opposition leaders made clear they did not want 
US military intervention’.75 All these including the prediction that Syria would be of 
great cost and that involvement might cause anti-US sentiment eventually made 
military intervention in Syria not a serious option.   
 
Timing 
The US assessment on cost mainly included that Libya was a crisis that really could 
be handled mostly by the Europeans and that the US could provide a supporting rather 
than a leading role in another intervention in the area of the Middle East. In addition 
to the calculation of low cost, there was another factor that further made the Libyan 
mission militarily feasible: the particular timing when President Obama chose to get 
involved. James Mann believed that the Obamians, a trusted crew of advisers to 
President Obama, actually did not expect a military campaign at the beginning, 
instead, they ‘hoped Gaddafi might behave like other Middle Eastern leaders in the 
early weeks of the Arab Spring, either stepping aside like Mubarak or announcing 
                                                        
73 Ibid. 
74 Martin Indyk, Kenneth Lieberthal, and Michael O’Hanlon (2012) p. 173. 
75 Ibid. 
 18 
some immediate reforms like Jordan’s King Abdullah’.76 Yet that was soon proved to 
be a misjudgement. What finally boosted the US move was when Gaddafi talked 
about going house to house in Benghazi to kill people like rats. The estimated number 
of innocent civilians who would be killed if that happened would be tens of thousands. 
To have that kind of slaughter undertaken with international community completely 
unable to do anything would be a real blemish on not just the US but also the whole 
world. Samantha Power later reflected, ‘We were trying to convince Gaddafi to act 
with restraint and moderation, but he had already, right from day one, decided to 
crush this thing. He was taking the other path, the non-Tunisia choice.’77 Although it 
is true that NATO allies and the international community cannot prevent every 
humanitarian disaster or prevent all the political misleads of some leaders, there are 
instances where they can do something about it. According to Obama’s speeches 
delivered in March, Libya was exactly the case where the international community 
had the capacity to achieve some goals. It was not about putting a risk higher level of 
interests, but an opportunity to work with allies and partners to realise an outcome in a 
reasonable amount of time. Moreover, Libya was actually regarded as an easy case 
because there was no leader like Gaddafi who truly enjoyed no regional affection.78 
When Gaddafi was talking about ‘purge’ that would proceed ‘room by room’ and 
‘individual by individual’, it was truly believed that he was desperate to do this.79 
Mindful that Gaddafi was a threat to not only his own people but also the region as a 
whole, the consensus among international community became unprecedentedly 
apparent that ‘Gaddafi must go and go for good’.80 Meanwhile, the debate over what 
the US should do also changed dramatically as regime forces approached Benghazi, 
for the possibility seemed to become more and more likely that there would be some 
massive civilian casualties because of regime attack on Benghazi. That really changed 
the tone of the debate in the US and a lot of objections to intervention were more or 
less pushed aside as the dynamic sound ground changed. As a result, the pace of 
decision-making was forced to accelerate when the Libyan military started moving 
incredibly fast.  
 
Once the UN Security Council Resolutions, the regional organisation, and the Arab 
League had justified on the necessary means, all political elements with respect to the 
legal basis for intervention were appropriately addressed. Moreover, most of the 
European allies agreed that Libya was the place NATO could act to prevent 
humanitarian catastrophe within the norms of international law, even though Germany, 
Poland and some others did not choose to contribute. Further, the potential fall of 
Benghazi made the Libyan crisis rise above the bar as a humanitarian emergency, 
                                                        
76 James Mann (2012) p.283. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Preventing Gaddafi from rebuilding the wall of fear that fell in Tunisia and Egypt was essential if the ‘Arab 
Spring’ was not to be succeeded by a new winter of discontent. See Dominique Moisi (2011). 
79 OSC Report GMP20110316950075, ‘Statement on Libyan TV Says Gaddafi Forces Await “Zero Hour’” To 
Retake Benghazi’, 16 March 2011, and OSC Report GMP20110317676005. 
80 ‘Libya: Obama, Cameron and Sarkozy Vow Gaddafi Must Go’, BBC News, 15 April 2011. 
 19 
urging the US to get involved at this particular timing. When all those came together, 
it became quite possible for the Obama Administration to take actions. 
 
Military capability 
In addition to the low cost and the particular timing, Washington also took the 
evaluation of military capability into account when making decision on Libya. There 
were some people like Kori Schake, who doubted whether the Europeans were really 
incapable of tackling Gaddafi on their own. By considering that ‘Libya spent only $1 
billion on its military in the year before the rebels and NATO militaries felled 
Muammar Gaddafi——that is around 2 percent of the UK’s defence budget’, he 
argued that ‘Britain’s superb military alone could probably have found a way to 
succeed’.81 In terms of pure balance of power, the British military was much more 
powerful than the Libyan military, however, when it came to this specific operation, 
specific capabilities rather than the overall strength would play a more effective role. 
First of all, in order to unfold the operation, the Libyan air defence network had to be 
taken down otherwise the pilots from any country would be at great risk. Frankly, 
besides the US, the ability to defeat the air defence system was something right now 
no European country or any other country in the world could do. For example, the US 
had vast piles of air-launched cruise missiles that were vital to create a no-fly zone in 
Libya, while the British only had very small reserves. Hence on this specific cruise 
missiles, Britain run out very quickly in the campaign, which dramatically decreased 
its capability to force the capitulation of the dictator. Hence, for the purpose of 
guaranteeing that the allies would not fail, the US ultimately decided to intervene as 
the cruise missiles provider who could just stand off either from sea or air to attack 
tanks and aircrafts. The reason why the Americans agreed to at minimum come for 
the first week to ten days of the air operation to knock put Gaddafi’s air force and 
radar was mainly because that no European country, or even the collection of 
European countries, could have done that. In short, it was not the British in aggregate 
terms that did not have more powerful military than Libya, but they just did not have 
the right technology and the right capability to implement the mission. 
 
With respect to how the campaign was truly carried out, Robert Gates complained that 
‘the mightiest military alliance in history is only 11 weeks into an operation against a 
poorly armed regime in a sparsely populated country. Yet many allies are beginning 
to run short of munitions, requiring the US, once more, to make up the difference’.82 
The gap between Washington and European capitals in terms of military capability 
was not build in a day.83 In other words, it would be unrealistic to expect those 
European allies to take the full burden or to stop relying on US assistance 
immediately. Moreover, in the case of Libya, the US actually had a long history with 
Gaddafi dating back to the 1980s when the Regan Administration bombed Tripoli and 
                                                        
81 Kori Schake (2012) ‘US Retrenchment Is Right And Overdue’, in Tomas Valasek (ed.), All Alone? What US 
Retrenchment Means For Europe And NATO, Centre for European Reform, p. 9. 
82 Ian Traynor (2011).  
83 For more information, see Appendix 1 ‘Armed Forces——Annual Strength’. 
 20 
Benghazi in retaliation for the attack on a West Berlin nightclub that killed 2 
American servicemen and injured 79.84 Viewing Libya as ‘low-hanging fruit’, the US 
was basically more experienced than those European countries to fight against 
Gaddafi. Therefore, based on the fact that the US was still indispensible in providing 
some critical military assistance to guarantee a victory, the Obama Administration 
finally decided to move forward and fight together with its allies.  
 
Why did the US transfer the Libyan mission to NATO and start ‘leading from 
behind’? 
Since 19 March, coalition military operations under the auspices of the US-led 
Operation Odyssey Dawn (OOD) had achieved the objective of setting up a no-fly 
zone over Libya, laying a solid foundation for transferring the Libyan mission to 
NATO. The transition from the US-led OOD to the NATO-led Operation Unified 
Protector (OUP) thereafter went seamlessly. 85  NATO allies reached a unanimous 
agreement on 27 March to direct NATO to assume command and control of the 
civilian protection.86 The next day, President Obama and his team provided an update 
on accomplishments to date, including the full transfer of enforcement of the no-fly 
zone to NATO.87 
 
Ever since the end of Cold War, the US has played a dominant role in almost every 
military intervention around the world. Even ‘President Obama has hardly been shy 
about the projection of American power. Indeed, he oversaw a “surge” of US troops 
into Afghanistan and has dramatically ramped up the use of drone strikes to combat 
militant extremists.’88 However, in the case of Libya, the US was, for the first time, 
not predisposed to the assertive and excessive use of military force, instead, it was 
perceived as ‘leading from behind’.89 The phrase certainly was not what the President 
or his advisers had ever mentioned, in fact, it was seized on in the media by unknown 
journalists. But it became widely accepted even in the official assessment on Libya 
military campaign.90 Compared with Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq where the US was 
directing or leading in a very obvious way, Libya saw the US declining to play a 
dominant role. James Lindsay argued that the reason why both President Clinton and 
President Obama tried to minimise the visible level of the US military involvement 
abroad was precisely because intervention had become ‘the worst choice and the 
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worst necessity’ both in Kosovo and Libya.91 In the case of Libya, if the US led from 
the front rather than led from behind, Gaddafi would have gone sooner and there 
would have been fewer deaths, yet how could the President deal with the following 
public condemnation of intervention? How could the President persuade those 
opponents who were extremely concerned that the US would sink into another 
‘quagmire' as in Afghanistan and Iraq? According to the Gallup poll conducted on 29 
March 2011, only 10% of Americans said the US should take the lead role in Libya, 
while the plurality, 36%, favoured a minor role for the US, and 22% thought the US 
should withdraw entirely.92 No one knew how precious the opportunity cost would 
have been if the US decided to lead from the front, but certainly the President would 
have faced tougher objections, threatening to shrink or even abolish the pursuit of 
intervention. Those domestic concerns could be addressed by applying the framework 
of NATO, which could help obscure the essential role of Washington. Mindful of 
what happened in the Iraq war where the Bush Administration’s unilateral proposal of 
global War on Terror resulted in a dramatic increase in transatlantic tension, it was 
politically important to transfer the Libyan mission to NATO and start ‘leading from 
behind’, because on one hand, public support for intervention would be secured and 
on the other hand, criticism about overextending US military would fall of itself. 
More importantly, ‘leading from behind’ was in line with Obama’s grand strategy on 
‘multilateral retrenchment’ which was designed to ‘curtail the United State’s overseas 
commitments, restore its standing in the world, and shift burdens onto global 
partners’.93 President Obama was elected to end the war in Iraq, who also placed great 
importance on multilateralism. He saw it as an opportunity to create more political 
benefits to the US by handing the Libyan mission to NATO, which would be 
characterised as a multilateral effort rather than the US acting unilaterally. 
 
Paula Newberg introduced an interesting explanation about ‘leading from behind’ that 
the US could only provide moral rather than material support. 94  Yet the US 
contribution was not really ‘constrained’. In theory, ‘leading from behind’ allowed the 
US to limit its dominant role, yet in practice, it was still the US military that provided 
the most capabilities. According to Ivo Daalder, the US Ambassador to NATO, in the 
initial operation which was conducted in a coalition format before NATO came in, the 
US was by far and away the dominate military contributor to the operation, providing 
all kinds of assets in order to make it possible.95 After 10 days operation, the US 
stepped back and NATO took over. Although the full transfer of command to NATO 
was planning to be completed just in several days, Robert Gates was not able to give a 
firm deadline for just how long US involvement would last.96  Thus, even in the 
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second part of operation, Washington continued to play a significant role behind 
scenes, leaving the American Navy and Air Force very much involved in enforcing a 
no-fly zone over Libya. For example, to minimise civilian casualties, it was required 
to obtain a high degree of surveillance, the vast majority of which was provided by 
the US. Generally, it was true that the US was not playing a dominant role in Libya, 
however, it did not mean that the US was not playing a significant role there. 
Although it were the Europeans who flew large number of combat sorties, the US 
support was absolutely essential, particularly in the area of the intelligence and 
surveillance. Further, as Nora Bensahel identified, another area where US assistance 
was also greater was in air-refuelling, which the Europeans had low capability of.97 
The US offered this decisive backing to some small countries that were flying sorties, 
particularly to Scandinavia, the Netherlands and Belgium that served to provide 
position ignitions. Basically, without the US air-refuelling and reconnaissance, there 
would have been little military effect from the NATO operations, given that the US 
provided the best bulks of air-refuelling that allowed aircrafts to be on station to 
complete both the surveillance and strike missions.  
 
Although Washington continued to provide significant and critical support even after 
transferring the Libyan mission to NATO, the signal came from the strategy of 
‘leading from behind’ was clear that the US would not always play a dominant role 
and the European allies should shoulder more responsibilities. To send that message 
around the world was meaningful to the US especially in the context of current 
economic pressures and domestic US debates about post-War on Terror interventions, 
but most importantly, it helped the US reconsider its role as a ‘global policeman’ and 
redefine the ‘American way of war’. Thus whether there was a so-called ‘Libyan 
model’ that could be applied to future crisis management became an interesting 
question.  
 
The so-called ‘Libyan model’ and the future of NATO 
 
As a rule of thumb, when the US is involved in a war, it always ‘throws enough 
money, weapons and people at conflicts to guarantee an overwhelming advantage for 
itself and it also has the technology to do much of the fighting from afar and therefore 
in relative safety’ (though not true of Vietnam).98 But the Libyan war did not match 
this default ‘American way of war’. There were many fresh elements that constituted 
the so-called ‘Libyan model’. During the conflict, the US left its European allies to 
lead, taking on a limited, supporting role for the first time. Even though the Obama 
Administration made clear it would not allow allies to fail, it contributed only enough 
assistance to prevent operations from failing, not enough for them to speedily succeed. 
Nourished by the leading thought that the Libyan war provided a likely blueprint for 
many future NATO operations, Kori Schake took the Libyan war as ‘the clearest 
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signal to date that the US will not do more, proportionally, than other allies when it, 
too, faces austerity’.99 From now on, America will behave like any other ally, sitting 
out some of NATO’s wars, and doing just enough to help other operations to succeed. 
The US armed forces will no longer automatically make up the difference between 
NATO’s ambitions and European military means. As Ivo Daalder concluded, ‘if there 
ever was a time in which the United States could always be counted on to fill the gaps 
that may emerge in European defence, that time is rapidly coming to an end’.100 
Beyond the theoretical dimension, the Obama Administration has declared Libya to 
be a demonstration of its strategic doctrine: in response to humanitarian crisis, the US 
will work with allies to gain international acceptance for intervention in support of 
indigenous forces and join a coalition to use military force. It will not play the 
dominant role in such coalitions. It will not support revolutionary movements without 
mandates from the United Nations Security Council.101  
 
Some scholars such as George Joffe, viewed the US decision on ‘leading from behind’ 
as not only a promise that America was happy to see European countries deal with 
such conflicts as Libya on their own, but also a reminder to its European allies that 
they should shoulder the responsibility to take all the relevant burdens resulted from 
their passionate action.102 It is true that many European governments have long hoped 
for a ‘European pillar’, a defence capability that is less dependent on US support. 
Ideally, the US retrenchment would certainly increase the likelihood of European 
countries leading future missions, however, many allies perceived Libya as an 
unsatisfactory experience. Robert Gates pointed out 
 
While every alliance member voted for the Libya mission, less than half have participated, 
and fewer than a third have been willing to participate in the strike mission…Frankly, 
many of those allies sitting on the sidelines do so not because they do not want to 
participate, but simply because they cannot. The military capabilities simply are not 
there.103  
 
This sad story made NATO’s European members rethink about their inability to 
project force and stability. Yet Tomas Valasek believed that most Europeans seemed 
to lack in their DNA the sense of global responsibility, which explained their shyness 
in using military force. The allies seemed to have no interest in fostering their 
ambition to play a bigger role in their own defence. Instead, they were more satisfied 
with the current situation that burdens and responsibilities were shifted to the US and 
that they could just stay calmly under the US security umbrella. But no matter how 
unwilling European countries were to spend their resources and use military forces, 
they were unable to find a reasonable excuse to free themselves from the burden-
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sharing responsibility. Thus, with Washington getting tired of shouldering the unequal 
division and growing to be more sensitive than ever to free-riding behaviours, the 
European allies should start playing a more active military role if they wanted NATO 
to persist. The Libyan war was exactly the beginning of ‘the time’. It introduced a 
new definition of ‘European way of war’. It reweighed the military disparity between 
America and its European allies. It also marked the advent of a new round of debate 
over the burden-sharing problem. 
 
The ‘American way of war’ has been the most often cited term when talking about the 
adversaries that NATO has fought in the past twenty years. Washington enjoys 
unmatched capability, raising the standard of performance so high that no other 
country dares to engage even in those military operations for which they have 
sufficient capability. On one hand, America has never been reluctant to pour such 
resources as personnel, money and weapons into conflicts; on the other, America has 
casted a long shadow not only within NATO but also around the world due to its 
unbeatable strength.  
 
The US has 11 aircraft carrier battle groups; no other nation has more than one. The US 
also has three times as many modern battle tanks, four times the number of fourth-
generation tactical aircraft (and is already fielding the fifth generation), more than three 
times as many naval cruisers and destroyers, 19 times as many tanker aircraft and 48 times 
as many unmanned aerial vehicles as any other country.104 
 
As a result, some European allies, who regarded ‘unable to perform as perfectly as 
America does’ as ‘unable to perform’, hesitated to advocate the ‘European way of 
war’. Nonetheless, the risk of fighting without America’s weapons was not as terrified 
as envisaged. The war fought to the European doctrine might bring troops in closer 
contact with the enemy, inflict more civilian casualties, and last longer, making it 
harder for the governments to keep public support. But these foreseeable difficulties 
were less knotty than the potential trouble that might be created if they refused to act 
without US participation.  It was because that the refusal means nothing but those 
members failed to intervene to protect people from autocratic governments, 
investigate or even destroy suspect nuclear facilities, and support freedom and 
democracy taking roots. It became clear that European allies had no better choice than 
taking necessary actions even without US support.  
 
In fact, the situation was quite promising when taking the evaluation of European 
militaries into account. 
 
The European allies have a million more troops under arms than the US…Any one of the 
major European militaries could have defeated any of the adversaries that NATO fought in 
the past 20 years. In combination, the Europeans’ fighting power is more than adequate to 
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impose their will even in some of the world’s most challenging battlegrounds such as the 
Middle East.105  
 
However, Europe underestimated its own strength for most of the time, relying on the 
American pledge to defend its allies. Thus, most NATO countries were well below 
the Alliance’s guideline of spending 2% of GDP on defence. In 2011, only Greece 
(2.4%) and UK (2.6%) spend above the threshold, while the US represents 4.8% of 
GDP in its defence budget. Defence spending per capita in the US is nearly double 
that of any NATO ally, at $2,062 per person, followed by Norway ($1,035), UK 
($970), France ($663) and Denmark ($635).106  
 
It seems that the unequal division between American and European military outputs is 
more like a self-created obstacle due to the unwillingness of European allies to 
increase their contributions. But this is not the whole story. The disparity between 
military capabilities does exist. Taking the Libyan war as an example, although the 
US took its stance of not playing a leading role, ‘it fired nearly all the cruise missiles 
that destroyed Libya’s air defences in advance of allied strike missions, provided the 
great majority of the aerial tankers and nearly all of the surveillance and electronic 
warfare elements on which allied fights depended, and flew 25 per cent of all 
sorties’.107 The Libyan operation was illustrative that it could not have been fought in 
the way it was without the US support. However, this does not mean that the war 
could not have been fought at all. As is mentioned above, the Libyan defence budget 
reached only $1 billion in the year before Gaddafi failed, which was approximately 2% 
of Britain’s. No one could really doubt that the European military forces led by 
Britain and France was unable to force the capitulation of a dictator and find a way to 
succeed. Thus, the European allies are not unable, but unwilling, to intervene to 
protect persecuted civilians the same as the US does, removing the veil of the long-
standing debate about the burden-sharing problem. 
 
Kori Schake emphasised three new elements that made the current round of burden-
sharing debate more serious than previous ones. ‘First, the major threats to the US are 
no longer European in origin…Second, US armed forces find coalition warfare more 
and more difficult and decreasingly helpful…The third and most important reason…is 
that pressures for austerity are likely to endure, not only in Europe but also in the 
US.’ 108  Others believed that the core variable refers to America’s own strategic 
adjustment----it changes to style itself more as a Pacific than a European power. In the 
President Obama’s 2012 review of military strategy, he expressed the will of focusing 
on more pressing threats in Asia and the Middle East whilst hoping that Europe would 
take control of its own security. The President also sent a message to the US allies in 
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Asia that American forces there would grow and new American marines would be 
deployed. Europe, on the opposite, did not receive any substantive reassurance from 
the US but a vague promise that ‘We’re going to continue investing in our critical 
partnerships and alliances, including NATO, which has demonstrated time and 
again——most recently in Libya——that it is a force multiplier’.109 And even worse, 
the Pentagon’s new ‘defence strategic guidance’ required the US to cut down the 
maintenance of its troops in Europe while denounced the dissatisfied performance of 
European forces.110 Many of the 80,000 US personnel stationed in Europe would be 
withdrawn, probably pushing the alliance back to its earlier model that no permanent 
presence of US forces in Europe was guaranteed. Hence Freddy Gray called Obama 
‘the Pacific President’ who was taking a decisive turn away from Europe in his 
second term.111  
 
The current US foreign policy tends to focus more on the Asian Pacific region, yet it 
does not ignore Europe completely. On 16 February 2013, President Obama gave the 
annual state-of-the-union message to Congress, announcing that America and the EU 
would begin talks to create a transatlantic free-trade zone.112 This proposal was not 
new, but reemphasised how top Europe ranks on the list of American foreign policy. 
Furthermore, in terms of Obama’s recent foreign policy vision outlined on 28 May 
2014, it seems that the US has refocused its attention on Europe: in addition to the 
remarkable claim that ‘America must always lead on the world stage’, Obama also 
emphasised the importance of mobilising allies and partners to take collective action, 
which sent a message to European countries in particular that the US would 
strengthen its cooperation with them in dealing with the Syrian and Ukrainian 
crises. 113  Moreover, Obama pledged a billion-dollar military programme of 
reinforcements in Europe in the wake of the Ukrainian crisis, reaffirming US 
commitment to Eastern Europe and showing US determination to ‘review its force 
presence in Europe in the light of the new security challenges on the continent’.114 So 
far, the Air Force Aviation Detachment (Av-Det) in Poland has got a continuous US 
presence, with 10 US Air Force members stationed at Lask Air Base. 115  This is 
certainly in conformity with the US promise to boost the military contingent in 
Europe, but the question remains as to how seriously can US commitment to Europe 
be taken, given that after all, Obama’s ‘European reassurance initiative’ was not about 
stationing US or NATO troops permanently in Poland or the Baltic states.116 Whether 
Washington is truly ‘refocusing’ its attention on Europe is ambiguous, nonetheless US 
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commitment to NATO is strengthened under current circumstances, regarding the 
need to show a strong response to Russia’s aggression.           
 
But it is not easy to assure a positive outcome of a reinvigorated transatlantic 
relationship that is based on the future rather than the past. As Mark Webber et al. 
point out, the challenge to NATO’s persistence nowadays is whether it can service its 
two motors: its principle of purpose and its principle of function.117 The Ukraine crisis 
has at least given NATO a purpose. But the good functioning of NATO has not been 
guaranteed, given that as a consequence of the Alliance’s operations ‘NATO is 
becoming solely dependent on the US nuclear guarantee’. 118  Such a situation 
reinforces the burden-sharing argument that is again emerging.119 Most importantly, 
the inherent NATO problems should be tackled. For the US commitment to the 
Alliance, what NATO operations discovered was constantly similar: the most likely 
factor that might terminate US commitment to the Alliance comes from the inherent 
problem of burden-sharing which has remained unresolved since the establishment of 
NATO. And the problem will possibly be repeated in Ukraine again if NATO 
ultimately get involved, given that NATO members have already been in 
disagreement: ‘Germany is more circumspect about sanctions against Russia, and 
wants NATO to keep to its 1997 agreement. France is at loggerheads with Poland 
(and America) over its plans to sell Russia two amphibious assault ships.’120 Some 
people might argue that the NATO problems had existed even before the 1990s and 
no serious consequence had been caused thus far. Yet the situation today is 
unprecedentedly complicated, which will probably bring an earthshaking change to 
the transatlantic relationship if it is not taken seriously. In short, with respect to the 
growing US preference for the ‘Pivot to Asia’ strategy, it becomes certain that ‘unless 
something changes, NATO will end up just doing less with less’.121  
 
 In the long run, NATO’s future depends in large part on whether the European allies 
find their willingness to play a role commensurate with their strength. But the process 
of transformation will take a long time in practice. Therefore, in the short run, a 
compromising mechanism among NATO members will prevail, requiring the ‘a la 
carte approach’ to be accepted as part of how NATO works. One lesson learned from 
Libya was that not all members would join all future NATO operations (only 8 out of 
28 allies followed the French and UK lead in bombing Libya). NATO members, who 
are no longer unified by a common enemy like the Soviet Union, begin to worry about 
different threats. And it becomes harder for allies to agree to fight wars that they care 
unequally passionately. Thus, NATO should allow some members to stay on the 
sidelines and contribute only symbolically (give their approval for NATO to unfold 
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the operation legitimately), rather than demanding every ally to take an effective role 
in NATO’s every military mission. Some people are opposed to the ‘division of 
labour’, for it would upgrade the risk of moral hazard in future military operations. 
However, this compromising solution is still better than the alternative that NATO 
members fail to launch, let alone accomplish missions altogether because some allies 
refuse to participate. Moreover, with regard to the strong possibility that Washington 
would lead fewer operations in the future, European allies should design a more 
agreeable rule of transatlantic cooperation in specific missions. They should take the 
initiative to make their military plans more explicit about how much support they 
expect from the US, and negotiate with the US on how and what kind of assistance 
the US should provide during operations. In short, to see NATO persist and capable of 
dealing with more issues in the future, European countries should make more 
contributions to the Alliance, and to the sustainment of a healthy relationship with the 
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